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The Major Powers and the Southwest Indian Ocean Islands: Prospects for Changes

National Intelligence Estimate

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NE 30/70-82
6 February 1982

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The MAJOR POWERS AND THE
SOUTHWEST INDIAN OCEAN ISLANDS:
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGES

Information available as of 16 February 1982 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate.

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS, EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.

Also Participating:

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army

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PREFACE

This Estimate assesses the current situation and the prospects for changes within the next three years in the political and economic ties and naval access arrangements made with the superpowers by the island states of the southwest Indian Ocean: Mauritius, Madagascar, Seychelles, and Comoros.

Heightened tensions in the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and southern Africa have generated expanded superpower interest in the Indian Ocean and consequently in these four island states. In recent years the Soviet Union and Western nations have increased their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and have been working to improve their political and military ties with these islands. Seychelles and Madagascar now look to Moscow for the bulk of their military aid, while the more conservative governments in Comoros and Mauritius rely on their former colonial rulers, France and the United Kingdom respectively, for similar support.

Increased superpower interest in the islands has magnified the political strains with which the island regimes must cope. Their leaders are concerned that externally supported coup attempts—such as the one in Seychelles in late November 1981—will become more frequent as external powers compete for influence. These leaders are trying to improve their internal security forces, which will increase their dependence on outside military aid. Further, longstanding racial and communal tensions and economic problems are complicated by divisions within each regime over how to respond to superpower initiatives. Some officials advocate strict nonalignment while others favor a long-term alliance with either a Western nation or the USSR.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

Soviet interest and activities in the southwest Indian Ocean have increased substantially in recent years. Moscow regards the states in this region as important targets of opportunity. The Soviets aim to supplant Western influence and to deny the United States military facilities in the Indian Ocean. Soviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean—which has been continuous since 1968—has increased during the past two years as Moscow has moved to counter expanded US naval deployment to the region and the growing US presence on Diego Garcia. The USSR has encouraged local governments to refuse the United States naval access and supports those groups that agitate against the Diego Garcia facility. Currently, the Soviets rely heavily on their military supply relationship as the basis of political influence with the island states.

The Soviets support the leftist governments of Madagascar and Seychelles and provide military aid to the uneasy leaders of these states. This aid will probably be stepped up as a result of the attempted coup in Seychelles in November 1981. Moscow also supports the leftist opposition group that now appears likely to replace the pro-Western government of Mauritius in the upcoming elections. Soviet efforts to forge links with leftist governments or political factions in the island states are complemented by the activities of Cuba, with which the more radical island leaders have ideological affinities. Libya also works against US interests in the region, especially in Mauritius.

Although the islands are of less importance to Moscow than the northwest Indian Ocean region, where the Soviets have long been actively involved in expanding their military and political ties, the USSR would like to gain access to air and naval facilities in the southwest Indian Ocean states. Such access would permit the Soviets to monitor Western naval activity more closely and pursue closer political ties. We do not believe that any of the islands' leaders—present or prospective—who are concerned about their nonaligned credentials, are prepared to conclude a formal military access agreement with the USSR in the near future, however.

US relations with the island governments are not strong and are unlikely to improve significantly in the near future:

- The enlarged US naval presence in the Indian Ocean—especially the US facility on Diego Garcia—will continue to be

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exploited in Soviet propaganda, heightening the sense of insecurity of the more radical leaders and encouraging them to look to Moscow for support.

- A decisive victory in the June 1982 election by Paul Berenger's leftist Mauritian Militant Movement in Mauritius probably would result in the loss of Western naval access there. The impact on Western naval operations would be negligible, but a leftward lurch in the political orientation of Mauritius would undercut Washington's already limited influence throughout the islands.
- If Berenger carries the election in Mauritius and follows through with plans to coordinate his foreign policy with Madagascar and Seychelles, US political influence would decline even further.

French and British influence in the islands is likely to endure, given the strong cultural affinities and the islands' need for economic aid. French and British economic ties provide them with some leverage over the island governments should the latter at some point consider granting greatly expanded military access to the Soviets. Even Madagascar, with the most radical regime in the area, has been forced by economic realities—including Soviet stinginess—to repair relations with the West.

British and French influence in the islands has definite limits, however. For example, economic aid and other ties with the United Kingdom and France are not likely to curb the leftist tendencies of radical regimes in the islands. Moreover, the French would see disadvantages for themselves in any active effort to promote broader Western interests. Paris almost certainly would avoid involvement in any debate on Diego Garcia, for example, to avoid criticism of France's military presence in the area.

Over the next three years, Moscow is unlikely to supplant Western influence. Soviet ties with the island states, however, probably will continue to expand. So far these ties are largely limited to military supply and training relationships, in part because of some local anti-Soviet sentiments or suspicions even among the more radical leaders. Further, Soviet reluctance to provide more than token economic aid to the islands may become a source of friction.

Nevertheless, the volatile domestic situations in the islands, with their potential for abrupt changes of government, are likely to persist and will continue to offer opportunities for external meddling.

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DISCUSSION

I. EXTERNAL INTERESTS IN THE ISLANDS

A. The USSR and Its Allies

Soviet Interests in the Indian Ocean

1. The Soviet Union's involvement in the Indian Ocean has grown significantly since the mid-1970s as the Soviet ability to challenge Western interests in this and other regions has increased, and as opportunities have presented themselves. The southwestern Indian Ocean states are not as central to Moscow's interests as the areas adjacent to the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, but the heightened pace of Soviet activity in the islands indicates that Moscow views them increasingly as important targets of opportunity.

2. Moscow's more aggressive strategy toward the island states serves its general aim of supplanting Western—particularly US—influence in the Third World and forestalling Chinese encroachments. As elsewhere, the Soviets are seeking to foster and support leftist and revolutionary change toward this end as well as to increase their global influence and garner support for their international positions.

3. The Soviet Union also has military interests in the Indian Ocean that are reflected in its policy toward the island states. Moscow:

- Wants to impede the expanded US military activities in the Indian Ocean, including the increased US naval operations and buildup on Diego Garcia.
- Wants to gain access to ports and airfields to monitor Western activity and secure greater operational flexibility for Soviet naval forces.

Moscow not only views the area as an important route of maritime transit between the European USSR and the Far East, but also recognizes its significance to Western and Asian commerce.

4. Soviet economic activities in the islands—mainly limited to access to the region's fisheries—also support these broader political and military aims.

Soviet Naval Activities and Aims

5. The Soviets have maintained a permanent naval presence in the Indian Ocean since 1968. The size of the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron fluctuates, growing larger during periods of tension and dropping back during more normal periods (see annex A). During 1981 the squadron averaged 28 to 31 ships, down somewhat from its peak strength of 30 to 39 ships throughout 1980 when there was a response to the US naval buildup. In addition, the Soviet Navy maintains six IL-38 antisubmarine warfare (ASW) aircraft for maritime reconnaissance in the region—four at Aden in South Yemen, and two at Asmara, Ethiopia.

6. Soviet naval operations are centered in the northwest Indian Ocean and Red Sea some three to seven days' steaming time from the islands. Soviet ships monitor the operations of Western naval forces, and the Soviet Navy maintains patrols in the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el Mandeb Strait. On the whole, however, the Soviet forces are less active than the Western navies on station in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet ships spend a substantial portion of their time at anchorages in international waters, often near South Yemen's Socotra Island. Most Soviet naval operations in the southwest Indian Ocean occur while Soviet ships are en route to port calls in littoral and island nations.

7. The Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron has a small but growing naval support facility at Dahlak Island, Ethiopia (see figure 1). Virtually all of the ships serving with the Indian Ocean Squadron spend some time at Dahlak for replenishment, crew rest, and light repairs. At present, major development of the facility is limited, however, because Dahlak lacks fresh water and other logistic necessities, and ships using the facility could be readily bottled up by a blockade of the Red Sea's southern exit.

8. Soviet naval ships also call regularly at Aden, but apparently make little use of any shore facilities at the port. A Soviet naval communication station and an intelligence collection facility are located near Aden.

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Figure 1
Indian Ocean



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Because of its international airfield, Aden serves as the squadron's logistic center—a role for which Dahlak is not well suited.

9. The Soviet squadron currently has no facilities in any of the island states. Its ships make port calls periodically in Mauritius and in Seychelles. Madagascar, while friendly to the USSR, currently does not allow naval ships or aircraft from any non-Indian Ocean state to use its ports or airfields, and Comoros has no military ties with Moscow.

10. The Soviets are continually probing for improved access to facilities in Third World countries, and those in the southwest Indian Ocean are no exception. The Soviets have reportedly been pressing President Ratsiraka for use of facilities in Madagascar in payment for extensive military assistance he has received, and they reportedly have requested improved access in Mauritius and Seychelles.

11. The use of facilities in the islands—especially those at the former French naval base at Diego Suarez in Madagascar—would be attractive to the Soviets as a means of supporting their naval presence in the Indian Ocean and cementing relations with the host nations. If the Soviets could have access to Diego Suarez on their own terms—with a repair ship stationed there, storage capacity ashore, use of airfields, and repair work on Soviet ships performed by Soviet technicians—they probably would divert some squadron repair work to Madagascar from Dahlak Island.

12. Access to an airfield in at least one of these countries would significantly improve current Soviet reconnaissance capabilities in the Indian Ocean. Soviet capability to monitor the operations of Western forces is substantially limited as long as the IL-38s, with a 1,300-nm radius, operate only from Aden and Asmara (see figure 2). If these aircraft could operate from one of the islands, they could monitor wider areas—including the immediate vicinity of the US naval facility at Diego Garcia and the transit lanes to and from it—or remain on station longer. Soviet-sponsored construction work currently under way at Aden International Airfield will ultimately give it the capability to accommodate TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft. In 1979 the Soviets suspended longer range flights over the Indian Ocean from the southern USSR by TU-95 reconnaissance aircraft, largely because of problems with overflight clearances.

13. On balance, we do not believe the Soviets require facilities in the islands to support current or modestly expanded operations. The Indian Ocean Squadron seems to have adequate support already available, and the islands are distant from its chief operating area. Further, the Soviets appear generally to take the long view when considering the acquisition of naval facilities, weighing carefully both the military and political value of such facilities. Moscow is aware that extreme pressure to obtain military facilities can backfire, resulting in the loss of good relations with a regional government and the reassertion of Western influence. Moreover, the Soviets recognize, given the sense of vulnerability of island leaders, that a massive buildup in one country might compromise Moscow's relations with other regional states.

14. At present the Soviets probably are working harder to undercut US access to regional facilities than to obtain such facilities for themselves. The patience with which the Soviets have pursued access to facilities in the Indian Ocean states, their strong verbal support for an Indian Ocean zone of peace, and other Soviet statements opposing great power use of facilities in the region reflect these priorities. The Soviets probably believe under current circumstances that a balanced and flexible policy—maintaining moderate pressure for military access while elsewhere encouraging policies that would restrict use by other external navies—is their best course.

Other Soviet Activities

15. *Mauritius.* Moscow currently has negligible influence with the pro-Western government of Mauritius, which is led by aged Prime Minister Ramgoolam. For several years, the Soviets have provided funds for the Mauritian Militant Movement (MMM)—the likely victor in the next election, which is scheduled to be held in June 1982.

16. Ramgoolam long has kept the Soviets at arm's length. His suspicions of them have increased as Moscow has expanded its military presence in the Indian Ocean and established close links with the more radical regimes nearby, and as the MMM has developed into a serious threat. Soviet poaching in the tuna-rich fishing grounds off Mauritius also has soured relations, leading Ramgoolam to decide against renewing a fisheries agreement with the USSR. Nonetheless,

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Ramgoolam, who views naval visits primarily as a source of foreign exchange, still permits Soviet ships to call at Port Louis.

17. **Madagascar.** Moscow has developed its closest regional links in Madagascar, where it is building economic, military, and political ties that are designed to place this island in a dependent position. Its left-leaning President, Didier Ratsiraka, sharply criticizes the US presence on Diego Garcia and in international meetings has supported Moscow on such sensitive East-West questions as the Afghanistan issue.

18. The Soviets provide Ratsiraka with at least 300 military advisers and the bulk of his military equipment, including 12 MIG-21 Fishbed aircraft. The Soviets are improving the military airfield at Diego Suarez ostensibly for Madagascar's use, although they probably hope eventually to fly maritime reconnaissance aircraft from there.

19. Moscow has rescheduled part of Madagascar's huge military debt, but the Soviets have provided little aid to alleviate Madagascar's deepening economic crisis. As a result, the Ratsiraka government has been reduced to bartering coffee and other exports with the Soviets to pay part of its obligation.

20. **Seychelles.** Moscow's influence in Seychelles has grown since mid-1977, when the pro-Western government of James Mancham was overturned by his Prime Minister, France Albert Rene. A key channel of Soviet influence with the pragmatic Rene is through several of his pro-Soviet cabinet ministers who share his fears of externally mounted coup attempts.

21. Under the auspices of Defense Minister Berlouis (who played a key role in the 1977 coup), the Soviet Union has become Seychelles' primary source of arms. Although the Tanzanians provide the bulk of the Seychellois' military training, a small number of Soviet advisers have secretly trained the military on Mahe, the main island, and in 1981 a group of Seychellois officers completed training in the Soviet Union.

22. Seychelles' Foreign Minister Hodoul also promotes Soviet views. He voted with Moscow on the Afghanistan issue at the UNGA in 1980 and is a strident critic of the US presence on Diego Garcia. Other pro-Soviet ministers have concluded a variety of

nonmilitary accords with Moscow that also serve to heighten its influence and enhance the Soviets' image locally.

23. Probably at the urging of his pro-Soviet aides, Rene called on Soviet ships twice in 1979 for a show of support. He also called on the Soviets and the French following a coup attempt in November 1981. On that occasion Soviet ships stayed in Victoria for several days.

24. **Comoros.** The Soviets currently have no active ties with the Comoro Islands, which straddle the Mozambique Channel. The three islands offer little militarily because their limited facilities are undeveloped and even less politically because of France's pervasive role. The conservative government led by Ahmed Abdallah would be unlikely to accept a Soviet presence for fear of losing the French and conservative Arab aid it relies on to stay in power. The Soviets reportedly unsuccessfully sought naval access in 1977, when a radical government held power.

East European Activities

25. The East Europeans have given little aid to the island nations, with East Germany and Romania playing the most active roles. Eastern Europe has provided a minuscule amount of military aid to Madagascar and has extended modest amounts of economic aid to Seychelles and Madagascar. Like the Soviets, the East Europeans have limited influence in Mauritius and none in Comoros.


Cuba's Role

26. Havana has no influence in Mauritius and Comoros. Its relations with Madagascar and Seychelles, however, recently have expanded, and these island states frequently work in concert with Cuba at various international meetings. Several Seychellois students are studying in Cuba. Cuba reportedly will soon send 15 technical assistance personnel, to Seychelles. The Cubans have supplied aid to the agricultural sectors of both countries, and for a time Cubans held some key advisory posts in their security services. Continued Cuban security assistance to Seychelles and Madagascar would likely increase Havana's leverage with Presidents Rene and Ratsiraka.

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Figure 2
Southwest Indian Ocean Islands and Diego Garcia



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B. The West

27. Western interests in the southwest Indian Ocean stem from historic colonial relationships and continued economic ties. Western powers have increased their Indian Ocean naval presence since 1979 in response to tensions in the Persian Gulf. The Western maritime powers are eager to ensure that Moscow does not gain any greater military access in the island states. The Western powers want to continue their own access—although they are not actively seeking use of additional facilities there—and seek to mute local claims to Western-held islands. The West hopes to achieve these aims by extending vital economic aid and maintaining cordial political ties.

US Influence

28. The United States has little economic or political leverage in most of the island states. Washington traditionally has relied on the former colonial rulers to promote US interests. US aid efforts are overshadowed by France and the United Kingdom in the economic sphere and, in the case of Madagascar and Seychelles, eclipsed by the Soviets in the military realm. The United States does, however, maintain a US Air Force satellite tracking station in Seychelles.

29. US naval forces in the Indian Ocean have increased substantially since 1979 in response to the tensions in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Until 1979, the only continuous US naval presence in the Indian Ocean consisted of the small MIDEASTFOR—a command ship and two destroyers—headquartered in Bahrain in the Persian Gulf. Three times a year, carrier or cruiser task groups from the US Pacific Fleet operated in the Indian Ocean for periods of six to eight weeks.

30. Since late 1979, however, at least one and usually two US carrier task groups have been present in the Indian Ocean. Moreover, since early 1980, a Marine Amphibious Unit of about 1,800 men on three to five ships has been in the Indian Ocean much of the time. These ships generally are on station in the northern Arabian Sea, making calls at ports around the Indian Ocean littoral, where the United States has limited access to facilities in Kenya, Oman, Somalia, and Djibouti.

31. Among the island nations, US naval ships regularly call at Port Louis, Mauritius, and US naval P-3 reconnaissance aircraft have authorization to stop over in Mauritius, although none has done so for years. Until late 1979 US ships and P-3 aircraft also used port and air facilities in Seychelles. Since then, however, the Rene government has implemented regulations on naval and air visits that effectively ban US calls. These include:

- A limit on visits by ships and aircraft of non-Indian Ocean states (six a year for ships and eight a year for aircraft).
- A ban on landing privileges for planes coming from or going to Diego Garcia.
- A ban on all nuclear-powered vessels or those carrying nuclear weapons.

These restrictions tend to affect the United States more than other foreign forces, because the United States refuses to declare whether its ships carry nuclear weapons and is the only country likely to be using the airfield at Diego Garcia. The United States does not call at Comoros and is restricted from calling in Madagascar by President Ratsiraka's policy of denying access to any non-Indian Ocean naval power. Washington's most important support facility for its naval presence in the Indian Ocean is the British territory of Diego Garcia, which was once administered by the United Kingdom from Mauritius.

32. *Mauritius.* US political influence in the region is greatest in Mauritius because of the generally receptive attitude of the island's staunchly pro-Western government. Despite Ramgoolam's claims to Diego Garcia—which are designed to undercut MMM efforts to exploit the issue—he has generally cooperated with Washington on the subject.

Ramgoolam has even encouraged Washington to step up naval calls at Port Louis. Mauritius has supported US views in international meetings and often played a moderating role in contentious debates affecting US interests. Prime Minister Ramgoolam met with President Reagan in October 1981 and reiterated Mauritian support for Western security objectives in the Indian Ocean.

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33. The United States also has some—albeit limited—economic leverage in Mauritius. Washington buys a portion of Mauritius's sugar—its principal crop—and has sharply increased food aid in recent years. Mauritius reaps considerable hard currency benefits from US ports calls, which recently have increased markedly. The hiring in 1981 of Mauritian construction workers for Diego Garcia and the proposed extension of \$2 million annually in economic support funds may further enhance US influence. The recent decision to reject a Mauritian bid to provide construction materials for Diego Garcia in favor of a US firm's bid, however, may become a source of friction.

34. *Madagascar.* US political influence in Madagascar is marginal, but may be slowly increasing. Ratsiraka in 1980 permitted the removal of equipment from a former NASA tracking station that he closed several years earlier and requested a US ambassador—there had been none since he rejected a nominee in 1976. These moves, however, appear to stem primarily from the hope of increased US food and technological aid and for the moment do not reflect a departure from Ratsiraka's leftwing policies.

35. US economic leverage in Madagascar is almost nonexistent, but it may pick up over time. The United States recently resumed food aid to Madagascar, and US oil companies have contracted to begin exploring Madagascar's oil reserves this year.

36. *Seychelles.* Washington's relations with the Seychelles Government have been cool but correct and center on the presence of the USAF tracking station. Rene concluded a new 10-year agreement with Washington in 1980 updating the terms of the lease. Economically, Seychelles is partially dependent on the station's \$2.5 million annual rental fee and the indirect income—possibly \$2.5-\$3 million annually—it generates. These two sources yield approximately 12 percent of Seychelles' gross domestic product. The United States is also initiating a \$2 million support program and is implementing AID, Peace Corps, and food assistance projects worth approximately \$2 million.

37. *Comoros.* The United States has little or no influence in Comoros, and few US officials have visited the islands. US trade with Comoros is negligible, and US economic assistance—provided through the World Food Program—is modest. President Ab-

dallah's claim last year that he is willing to negotiate a military access agreement with the United States probably reflects his government's dire economic straits and his concern that the French may withdraw aid, rather than a marked tilt toward Washington.

French Interests

38. France's main interests in the Indian Ocean are to: ensure the security of shipping routes through which a large percentage of its energy supply passes; maintain the security of French citizens and territories in the area; promote French economic interests; and maintain a role as a great power with a right to speak in regional disputes. French efforts also are designed to preclude an increase in Soviet influence. Despite the French Socialist Party's earlier support for demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, the Mitterrand government probably will continue quietly to maintain the French military presence in the Indian Ocean, and to leave the door open for cooperation with the United States and other Western countries in the event of a threat to the freedom of the sea in the region.

39. France's powerful influence in the region derives largely from its continuing military presence and economic ties. French bases and ground forces in the southwest Indian Ocean generally remain unmatched by any other nation. An air transport squadron with about 350 support personnel and some 1,800 additional troops are stationed on Reunion Island, a French overseas department. Approximately 200 French troops are stationed on Mayotte, an island in the Comoros group whose people opposed independence and which is an overseas territory of France.

40. The French maintain some 25 to 30 naval ships in the Indian Ocean. Additional French combatant ships temporarily augment this force from time to time. The French ships call in Mauritius and have visited Seychelles more often than either US or Soviet ships. Most of the French ships are based at Reunion and at Djibouti where the French maintain about 4,600 troops along with 10 fighter aircraft, 14 helicopters, and five transport aircraft.

41. Paris views its modern airbase and deepwater port at Reunion as essential to a continued French military presence in the southwest Indian Ocean.

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Since the mid-1970s the French have also built modest military facilities such as monitoring stations and airstrips on five small and previously uninhabited islands near Madagascar, along the Mozambique Channel—currently the most economical major super-tanker route between the Persian Gulf, and Europe and the United States.

42. The governments of Mauritius and Comoros view the French naval presence as protection against radical foreign or domestic opposition, though they probably question Mitterrand's commitment to such a role. Island states like Seychelles and Madagascar, which generally are less friendly toward the West, still believe that Paris can make or break regimes in the area. Local officials were impressed by the coup in the Comoros in 1978, which was led by French mercenary Robert Denard. Although the French Government repeatedly denied any role in that event, recurrent rumors of French plotting worry both Madagascar and Seychelles and make them hesitant to offend Paris. These anxieties, which had been diminishing slowly, probably will decline more rapidly now that Mitterrand is in office and official French policy emphasizes nonintervention.

43. Economic ties also give France some leverage in the area. Ten years ago, French business interests dominated most of the island nations. Today, even after an anticolonialist reaction and in some cases a systematic rooting out of French-dominated corporations, French interests are still extensive. The French continue to provide substantial development aid and assistance to all of these countries.

44. France's aid to the islands is largely designed to mute local claims to French possessions in the area, especially those on which France maintains military facilities. Paris hopes to discourage any support to the nascent independence movements on Reunion. The French are unlikely to cede any of the islands off the coast of Madagascar, despite Malagasy claims to them.

45. The French also have retained strong cultural ties in the island states. French citizens, though less numerous than a decade ago, still hold important economic and social positions, and French officials and residents retain links with powerful, wealthy local families. Many island citizens still send their children to French schools, thereby fostering Western influence in the elites.

46. In Mauritius, France has strong political and economic influence with the Ramgoolam regime, which Paris hopes will retain power. A French Army contingent advises the Mauritian police force and provides military equipment. Paris has played a role in Mauritian politics, supporting the conservative Franco-Mauritians who own most of the local sugarcane estates.

47. Despite earlier strained relations, the French remain the dominant foreign influence in Madagascar. French economic aid to Madagascar has tripled since 1977, making it the island's principal economic benefactor. There are some French military advisers in Madagascar, and President Ratsiraka appears interested in renewing a military aid program. The French encourage Ratsiraka to avoid ties with Moscow and their extensive aid to him serves as an important counterweight to increased links with the Soviet Union.

48. France has been less active in the former British colony of Seychelles than in the other islands, although its influence is increasing. The French temporarily withdrew a substantial amount of economic aid in 1979, when Rene detained a French officer for alleged coup plotting and nearly broke relations with Paris. Relations subsequently improved, however. Rene called on the French to provide a naval presence following the November 1981 coup attempt. French aircraft also provide reconnaissance support to Seychelles. Rene is likely to continue promoting cordial political ties to maintain French economic aid.

49. In Comoros, the French provide the bulk of President Abdallah's military and economic aid. He in turn refrains from pushing hard for the return of Mayotte. Abdallah's regime is unpopular, however, and almost certainly would fall without French support.

France would be unlikely, however, to withdraw completely given the likelihood that any successor government would be openly critical of French activities in the region.

The British Role

50. British influence in the Indian Ocean islands had declined markedly until the present government

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came to power. Under Prime Minister Thatcher, the United Kingdom has placed increased emphasis on maintaining a British presence east of the Suez, and is committed to strengthening its ties there.

51. As a result, in 1981 the British decided to try to keep two warships in the Persian Gulf area. In recent years, the British naval presence has consisted of ships in transit or deployed for brief periods to the Indian Ocean. The United Kingdom has no naval facilities in the islands, but Royal Navy ships call frequently at Port Louis, Mauritius.

52. London's regional leverage today falls far below that of Paris. The United Kingdom generally provides less economic aid in the area than France and has fewer cultural ties. French is spoken more frequently than English in the UK's former colonies of Mauritius and Seychelles. Furthermore, London has negligible influence in Madagascar and Comoros.

53. London still administers the Chagos Archipelago under the rubric of the British Indian Ocean Territories. The largely uninhabited Chagos group, which the United Kingdom detached from Mauritius in 1965, contains the island of Diego Garcia, leased to the United States in 1976.

54. The British have considerable political influence in Mauritius, because it is a Commonwealth member and because of Prime Minister Ramgoolam's staunchly pro-Western attitudes. London provides limited economic aid to Ramgoolam, and a few British military advisers are in the country to instruct a Mauritian mobile security unit.

55. The issue of Diego Garcia has become a growing irritant in Anglo-Mauritian relations, however. Ramgoolam usually supports his token calls for Diego Garcia's return by claiming that he was forced to cede it to London in exchange for a speedy independence settlement and sizable economic aid package. London so far has managed to dodge the issue without great difficulty.

56. British ties with Seychelles have decreased in recent years, but London still plays an important role there and remains the principal aid donor. The United Kingdom, like the United States, no longer has naval

access to Victoria, and Rene's distrust of the West led him to cancel plans to accept British military aid. The presence in London of former Seychelles President Mancham, who was linked to the mercenary coup attempt last November, probably has increased Rene's suspicions of the British.

C. Third World Countries With Regional Influence

57. All the Indian Ocean island leaders have sought support from other Third World nations in an attempt to prevent a total reliance on a superpower or one of its allies. Madagascar continues to receive military aid from North Korea, while Seychelles depends on Tanzania for similar assistance. Now, however, aid from the superpowers and their allies largely outweighs Third World aid efforts, although various Third World nations—especially Libya—continue to exert influence in the island republics.

Libya

58. Increased Libyan initiatives in the island states have been motivated by Qadhafi's desire to spread his political and religious views throughout the Third World. Libya is most active in Mauritius and Seychelles; it has few ties with Madagascar, though a recent \$50 million loan could portend greater influence. Libya has few ties with the current Comoran Government. However, Comoran President Abdallah claims that Tripoli has made numerous overtures to the Comoros but all have been rejected—especially the Libyan request to open a People's Bureau in Moroni and an offer to "look after" Comoran national security. The Libyans probably also maintain contact with the small Comoran dissident groups in exile.

59. The Libyans are a highly influential yet unpredictable element in the Mauritian political situation, especially as the election approaches. Although they maintain ties with Ramgoolam, the Libyans actually are supporting the MMM in its bid to defeat the Prime Minister. Libya's primary source of influence is the active, generally pro-MMM Muslim community in Mauritius, which constitutes 17 percent of the population.

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60. In 1981, Libya's diplomatic initiatives in Mauritius expanded dramatically. Tripoli opened a new cultural center in Port Louis, where it claims 2,000 students are studying Arabic. The Libyans also have made inroads in the press, and may be distributing funds among the Muslim population. The Ramgoolam government recently warned the Libyan Peoples Bureau to stop interfering in Mauritian internal affairs.

61. Rumors persist in Seychelles and Mauritius that the Libyans are caching weapons on one or several of Seychelles' outlying islands to aid the MMM in a coup against Ramgoolam. Given the MMM's good chance of winning the next election, however, Berenger probably would not resort to an extralegal move unless he believed Ramgoolam rigged the election or unless the Prime Minister declared a state of emergency to delay the vote.

62. Libya's influence in Seychelles stems partly from its close relationship with Rene, who reportedly received funds from Qadhafi before the islands' independence. Libya recently has provided generous grants and interest-free loans [redacted]

[redacted] Qadhafi was quick to offer additional aid following the failed coup attempt in November 1981.

63. Despite recent initiatives, Libyan influence so far is limited in Seychelles. The Seychellois reportedly have encountered difficulties in persuading the Libyans to supply promised grant funds. In addition, Rene has refused to sign a fisheries agreement with Libya that would have granted Libya rights within Seychelles' territorial waters.

Other Arab Interests

64. Except for Madagascar, the island states' oil needs are minuscule compared to more industrialized African nations. Still, oil imports remain problems for all of the island leaders, giving Arab suppliers considerable leverage. Arab states such as Iraq and Algeria have supplied oil and economic aid to the radical regimes in Seychelles and Madagascar. Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait have provided oil and established links with ideologically compatible regimes in Mauritius and Comoros.

The Africans

65. Despite their proximity to the African continent and their membership in African organizations, the island republics have minimal ties with their mainland neighbors. South Africa, however, considers the southwest Indian Ocean region strategically important and maintains a close watch on the island republics. Pretoria trades with all of the islands and has extended some aid to Mauritius, where South Africa has its only air links in the region. (Both Seychelles and Madagascar broke off all air links with Pretoria.) South Africa also has offered to provide limited funds to conservative politicians in Mauritius.

66. After South Africa, Kenya is the island republics' second-largest African trading partner, but Nairobi has few political links with any of the islands.

67. Tanzania's ties to the islands have been largely restricted to the military area [redacted]

[redacted] Nyerere continues to grant military aid to Seychelles, and a Tanzanian military contingent maintained in the Seychelles since the 1977 coup was reinforced immediately after the coup attempt last November. Nyerere's penchant for meddling also led him to maintain troops in Comoros under Abdallah's radical predecessor.

The Asians

68. China's influence has waned in the more radical states of Seychelles and Madagascar, but Beijing still serves to counter Soviet interests in the islands. Chinese diplomats, for example, continue to stress the dangers of alignment with Moscow, and Beijing extends economic aid to all of the island states. China late last year hosted a high-level Mauritian Government delegation in an attempt to enhance the Labor Party's election prospects with the island's influential Chinese population.

69. India has close cultural ties with the majority Hindu population in Mauritius. But the Gandhi regime is unhappy with Ramgoolam's expanding relations with South Africa and his close links with the

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Figure 3**Prime Minister Ramgoolam**

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West. Gandhi is covering all bases for the Mauritian election by maintaining contacts with Ramgoolam's Labor Party, which enjoys the bulk of the Hindus' support, and with the opposition MMM party. New Delhi may also increase its influence in Seychelles if it follows through on its plans to extend a small amount of military aid.

70. Pyongyang once enjoyed considerable influence in Madagascar and Seychelles, but, like Beijing, its role has been overshadowed by Moscow's initiatives. North Korea has loaned four MIG-17s to Madagascar. Pyongyang also maintains several hundred military and civilian technicians in Madagascar, but their arrogant behavior has alienated them from most of the Malagasy.

II. LOCAL DYNAMICS**A. Mauritius**

71. The Mauritian Government faces complex economic problems that at present seem to point to the ailing 81-year-old Prime Minister Ramgoolam's loss to the radical MMM in the next election, which is scheduled to take place in June 1982. In the eyes of

many Mauritians, the leadership, in power since before independence, is too old, conservative, and out of touch to handle the country's pressing problems, which are accentuated by record unemployment and inflation rates. Corruption and splits within the ruling Labor Party have further tarnished its image, convincing many Mauritians that a change is essential to carry out new economic programs. The election is further complicated by reports that Ramgoolam has cancer.

72. Even a generous infusion of Western aid probably will not resolve Ramgoolam's economic woes, however. Mauritius's one-crop economy based on sugar has been damaged by cyclones, drought, crop disease, low worldwide prices, and a series of crippling MMM-initiated labor strikes. Past government overspending has exacerbated Mauritius's problems.

73. An MMM government might be able to instill more labor discipline, but otherwise it would be no better equipped to cope with Mauritius's externally caused economic problems than its predecessor. As a result, it probably would soon find itself subjected to some of the same criticism as that directed at the Ramgoolam regime. The economy under an MMM government also would probably suffer from the suspicions of the business community and a reluctance on the part of Western companies to invest for fear of government takeovers.

74. To forestall public criticism, an MMM government would try to circumscribe the activities of some of Mauritius's democratic institutions—especially the free press. The MMM also might attempt to restrict Mauritius's parliamentary process by taking advantage of extensive constitutional powers that fall to the ruling party. The movement would move gradually in these efforts, however, as the generally politically sophisticated Mauritians would resent them.


75. If the MMM wins, Soviet prospects there would improve decidedly. The MMM's left-leaning leader Paul Berenger has maintained close ties with Soviet diplomats for several years.

In addition to strengthening their political bonds, the Soviets would develop close ties in the intelligence and military fields. The MMM would attempt early in its tenure to purge the Ramgoolam loyalists from the security and intelligence organs and would seek advice and support

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Figure 4**MMM Secretary General Beranger**

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from Moscow and its allies. In view of the MMM's likely fears of a Western-led coup attempt, the MMM probably would eventually organize a military establishment with Soviet advisers and weaponry. An MMM government also probably would conclude a variety of other Soviet-Mauritian agreements such as cultural and fishing accords that Ramgoolam has refused to sign. Finally, an MMM government in Mauritius—with Soviet prompting—almost certainly would step up its criticism of the US facility on Diego Garcia and effectively discontinue US port calls.

76. An MMM government also would step up Mauritian claims to Diego Garcia as well as deny the United Kingdom naval access. British military advisers also would no longer be welcome.

77. Despite the MMM's longstanding ties with the French Socialist Party, an MMM government would be likely to press Paris to remove its military forces from the region as well as to decolonize Reunion and cede nearby Tromelin Island to Mauritius. The MMM also probably would curtail or deny French naval access and replace the French military advisers currently training the Mauritian police.

78. The MMM's ability to carry out these policies depends on whether it can win a clear majority in parliament. If it is forced into a coalition with a minority party, its freedom of action will be curtailed. There is a chance that the Labor Party, exploiting Hindu fears of a Communist-dominated MMM government, could rally enough support to defeat the MMM by forming a coalition with a number of small conservative parties—as it did in the 1976 elections. In this event, the Soviets probably would continue to maintain only marginal influence. Ramgoolam also would work to limit Libyan influence in the Muslim community. The Prime Minister would be likely to seek aid from more conservative Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia to undercut Libyan activities.

B. Madagascar

80. President Ratsiraka's concern about his staying power and longstanding fear of a Western- or South African-backed coup attempt have led him to build a well-equipped, largely Soviet-trained military force and a security service reportedly advised by the East Germans. He arrested several military and church leaders in January 1982 for allegedly plotting a coup involving South African mercenaries. Ratsiraka has some reservations about the Soviets, however, and is uneasy with Moscow's pressure for air and naval access at Diego Suarez. In the past year Ratsiraka has been exploring the possibility of French or US military aid, possibly in an attempt to reduce his ties with the USSR.

81. Ratsiraka's ill-advised economic policies as well as a variety of external factors—poor weather, rising oil prices, and low worldwide demand for coffee, Madagascar's largest export—have contributed to a

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Figure 5**President Ratsiraka**

bleak economic picture that is unlikely to improve noticeably during the next year or so. The resulting problems—food shortages and high unemployment and inflation rates—have worsened age-old tribal tensions between the lighter skinned, relatively well-off highlanders and the underprivileged darker skinned coastal dwellers.

82. Economically inspired rioting broke out in the capital in December 1980, continued intermittently through February 1981, then erupted again in November 1981. More recent disturbances occurred in Diego Suarez. Ratsiraka controlled the situation with troops and curfews. The underlying frictions and economic problems remain, however, raising serious questions about the Malagasy leader's resilience. Moreover, the willingness of several sectors of society to resort to violence to express their frustrations worries many Malagasy leaders who are well aware that similar eruptions brought down earlier governments.

83. The Malagasy Government recently took several steps to acquire increased Western aid in the hopes of improving Madagascar's economic prospects. The Malagasy in 1981 rescheduled their debt to the Paris

Club (a group of West European and US financial institutions), persuaded the French to increase their already sizable aid commitment to Madagascar, and negotiated a standby agreement with the IMF. The terms of Madagascar's loan from the IMF have already forced Ratsiraka to adopt a number of austerity measures, and more must be implemented to meet its terms.

84. We doubt at this point that any of the small disorganized parties that along with Ratsiraka's own party form the umbrella National Front are planning to launch an effective bid for power. But Moscow has long supported Richard Andriamanjato and his Congress Party for Malagasy Independence—one of the National Front partners—and could even decide to aid him in the presidential election, which is scheduled for late 1982. Should prolonged civil unrest cause Ratsiraka's position to appear irretrievable before then, the Soviets might maneuver behind the scene to bolster the succession prospects of Andriamanjato or a military leader with whom their military advisers have developed close ties. For the moment, however, Moscow appears primarily concerned with wearing down Ratsiraka's resistance to granting military access by building up Madagascar's debt to Moscow and by trying to foster anti-Western attitudes through the media.

85. Despite Moscow's efforts to cover its bets, it may have difficulty developing widespread influence under any Malagasy regime. Ratsiraka, for his part, would be unwilling to risk the loss of badly needed Western economic aid and his credentials as a non-aligned leader by opening the door too widely to Moscow. Moreover, the Soviets' meager economic aid has made them unpopular with many Malagasy Government officials. Malagasy military officers trained in the Soviet Union also have little favorable to report about the Soviets. A military access agreement with Moscow under any Malagasy government might trigger widespread unrest among the traditionally xenophobic Malagasy.

C. Seychelles

86. Of the four island leaders, Seychelles President Rene's domestic position appears most secure. His security forces have just turned aside a serious coup attempt; he has no visible rivals at the moment; the

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Figure 6**President Rene**

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Seychelles economy is comparatively healthy; and relative harmony prevails among the racially mixed Seychellois.

87. A pragmatist, Rene so far has played a moderating role in many of the initiatives of his pro-Soviet ministers. Rene is sympathetic to most of their views, however, and intercedes only when he believes that other significant national interests—such as the Western-oriented tourism industry—are at stake.

88. Rene's longstanding fears of being overthrown—dating from his own successful coup in 1977 and influenced by the recent coup attempt—also have helped to ensure Moscow's influence. Given Rene's eagerness to acquire long-range coastal surveillance systems and his recently reinforced concern for security, the Soviet advisory presence is likely to grow. Rene is unlikely in the near term to grant the Soviets any formal military access or naval facilities, or to allow a large Communist military presence, however, for fear that either might harm Seychelles' tourism industry, evoke an antigovernment reaction, or jeopardize the arrangement for the US tracking station. These concerns also probably will cause Rene to limit Cuban involvement in Seychelles in the near term.

89. Seychelles has a high standard of living by Third World standards, but a recent decline in tourism revenues portends serious problems for the economy over the next couple of years. A continued decline in tourism would lead to a cutback on needed imports and a low or negative growth rate. In addition, the Rene government has used loans from a wide variety of donors to make large financial outlays for a number of ambitious social programs. Any major purchases of military equipment would add to the country's financial problems. A less healthy economy probably would result in increased unemployment and other problems, especially for the darker skinned, traditionally less educated Seychellois. They might grow to resent Rene, who is white, if he ceased to provide them the jobs and social services they now enjoy.

90. No Seychellois politician on the island appears interested in challenging the generally popular Rene soon, although such a bid might eventually come from one of Rene's more radical ministers who over time might grow impatient with his more pragmatic policies. Three of these ministers launched the coup that brought Rene to power, and several of them have links to the Soviets. In the near term, however, we believe that the Soviets would not encourage such an effort because they believe their opportunities to expand their influence with the present government have been enhanced in the wake of the recent coup attempt.

91. Soviet influence in Seychelles, however, will be constrained by Rene's sympathy for the concept of nonalignment and his preference for maintaining a distance from all superpowers. Moscow's continued unwillingness to provide Rene enough economic aid or investment to counter what he now receives from his tourism trade, the tracking station, and other sources of Western aid will also limit Soviet influence.

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D. Comoros

93. The conservative Muslim regime in Comoros is led by President Ahmed Abdallah, a corrupt businessman who came to power in 1978 via a coup led by French mercenary Robert Denard. Abdallah enjoys little if any popular support and relies totally on the French for security. The President's personal security force, which includes French military advisers as well as some of the European mercenaries who brought him to power, is the regime's major prop.

94. Paris reportedly is displeased with Abdallah's irresponsible rule and has told him to improve his performance or risk a withdrawal of French military and economic support. But France is unlikely to carry out its threat since a withdrawal of its aid to Abdallah would probably result in the collapse of his regime, and any successor to Abdallah would probably work to undercut French influence in the region.

95. Should Abdallah be removed from the scene, the islands' new leadership probably would emerge from one of several exiled Comoran dissident groups. Abdallah's most likely successor is left-leaning Muzawoir Abdallah, the leader of a Paris-based group. He probably would pursue closer ties with Madagascar and Seychelles and the radical Arabs. In any case, a radical successor to Abdallah would be tempted to turn to the USSR, Libya, or Cuba for security assistance to forestall another Denard-style coup.

E. Regional Relationships

96. The regimes in Madagascar and Seychelles have similar foreign policies and domestic ideologies, and have engaged in occasional military cooperation. If Berenger wins the coming election in Mauritius, these island leaders might attempt to coordinate their foreign policies, especially in international meetings.

97. Both Rene and Ratsiraka favor Berenger's radical movement. Neither has provided significant financial aid to his electoral campaign, but their regimes reportedly have funneled Soviet funds to the MMM. Both probably would respond to any postelectoral requests for limited military aid by Berenger—either to reinforce his victory or possibly to attempt to reverse his defeat.

III. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

98. US relations with the island governments are not strong and are unlikely to improve significantly in the near future. Therefore, US interests would be served if the island states were nonaligned. At present, prospects for obtaining increased air and naval access to these islands are poor. These limitations will not seriously damage US interests, however, as long as the Soviets do not obtain exclusive military access, especially in Madagascar, which has the finest port in the region.

99. US interests in denying the Soviets exclusive military access are served by the region's former colonial powers, the UK and France. At present the government in Paris has the best opportunity to exercise a moderating influence on the radical regimes in the area and on a possible MMM government in Mauritius.

100. The two most immediate challenges to US interests in the region are the uncertain situation in Madagascar and the good prospects for an MMM victory in Mauritius. In Madagascar, President Ratsiraka appears secure for the moment, but a deteriorating economic situation and the regime's growing estrangement from the populace portend future instability. Moscow now appears content to work with Ratsiraka, but if he does not become more cooperative the Soviets may decide to promote the fortunes of a more pliant leader who would be willing to accord them exclusive military access.

101. A decisive election victory by the MMM in Mauritius in June 1982 could trigger a chain of events that would undercut the already limited US political ties with the island regimes and focus attention on the US tracking station in the Seychelles. The United States probably would lose naval access to Port Louis, and be left with no friendly ports in the island states.

102. A trilateral grouping of Seychelles, Madagascar, and an MMM-led Mauritius probably would adopt more aggressive, radical—and especially anti-US—policies than any one of them has adopted individually. In international meetings and on their own, the new group of young radicals would press vigorously Mauritian claims to Diego Garcia in contrast to Ramgoolam's pro forma calls for its return.

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The group also would strongly support the concept of an Indian Ocean zone of peace and would push for concrete proposals to implement it. With Moscow's aid, such a group also would continue seeking to focus world attention on the US military presence in the Indian Ocean, including our access to facilities in Kenya, Somalia, Oman, and Djibouti.

103. Such a group would be more subject to Soviet influence, especially in view of Moscow's efforts to play on the island leaders' fears of Western subversion. Moscow has chosen to trumpet allegations about improvements to the US naval facility on Diego Garcia and has leveled charges of US-South African collusion against radical island regimes and black regimes in southern Africa. The island leaders would be unlikely in the near term to grant the Soviets military access rights, however, given their own suspicions of Moscow and their desire to maintain a nonaligned image.

104. In the event Ramgoolam wins the Mauritian election, US regional interests would be bolstered initially. But a Ramgoolam government would need a

substantial Western economic aid commitment just to keep the economy afloat.

105. Over the next three years, the Soviets will attempt to increase their influence in the islands, probably with mixed results. Anti-Western bias and the increasing fears and uneasiness among island leaders will give Moscow increasing opportunities to strengthen its ties, especially through the provision of military and security assistance.

106. The Soviets' efforts to extend their influence beyond military supply and training relationships so far have met with only marginal success. Island leaders are strongly nationalistic and may heed the counsel of other Third World countries such as Tanzania to limit ties with the Soviets. In addition, Soviet ties are new—there was no Soviet presence of any kind on the islands before 1969—and in some cases are superficial. Moscow has had difficulty overcoming the islands' Western political and social traditions. Moreover, Moscow's efforts will also be hindered by the islands' continuing substantial dependence on West European economic aid and trade.

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ANNEX A


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Figure A-1

Soviet and US Naval Ship-Days in the Indian Ocean, 1970-81



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Table A-1
Indian Ocean Island Harbors

Country	Harbor	Coordinates	Capacity and Depths	Remarks
Mauritius	Port Louis	20°12'S/57°30'E	Depths in harbor to 12 meters. Ample anchorage in outer roadstead; depths of 14-18 meters. Can accommodate Soviet cruiser-class ships.	Large ship repair facility.
Madagascar	Diego Suarez	12°16'S/49°17'E	Large natural coastal harbor; depths in channel and harbor range from 15 to 27 meters. Could accommodate any size naval craft.	Contains good facilities for docking and ship repair.
	Tamatave	18°08'S/49°22'E	Depths in harbor range from 22 to 488 meters. Could accommodate any size naval craft.	Primary port in Madagascar.
	Majunga	15°34'S/46°22'E	No deepwater pier. Anchorage 13.5 miles offshore with a depth of 9 meters. Ships of cruiser size could anchor but would find accommodation highly inconvenient.	
Seychelles	Victoria, Mahe	04°37'S/55°27'E	Consists of an inner and outer harbor linked by a channel that is 11 meters deep. Outer harbor is 18-24 meters deep and inner harbor is 12 meters deep. Both can accommodate most Soviet warships except a Kiev or Moskva class.	
Comoros	Moroni, Grande Comore	11°41'S/43°16'E	Suitable only for patrol craft.	
	Mutsamudu, Anjouan	12°10'S/44°25'E	Could accommodate only smaller frigate classes such as the Riya, Petya, Mirka, or Grisha.	

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Table A-2
Major Indian Ocean Island Airports

Country	Airport	Coordinates	Elevations (meters)	Runway Length/Width (meters)	Remarks
Mauritius	Plaisance, International	20°26'S/57°40'E	57	2,591/46 (bituminous concrete)	Could accommodate an IL-38 maritime reconnais- sance aircraft and possibly a TU-95 Bear.
Madagascar	Antananarivo/ Ivato International	18°48'S/47°29'E	1,279	3,100/45 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38 and a TU-95.
	Antananarivo/ Arimonimamo	19°02'S/47°10'E	1,450	2,505/45 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38.
	Diego Suarez/ Andrakaka	12°15'S/49°15'E	61	2,500/45 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38.
	Majunga/ Ambovo	15°40'S/46°21'E	26	2,200/45 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38 at less than maximum gross takeoff weight. Unable to accommodate a TU-95.
	Tamatave	18°06'S/49°23'E	6	2,200/40 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38 at less than maximum gross takeoff weight. Unable to accommodate a TU-95.
Seychelles	Seychelles/ International	04°40'S/55°31'E	3	2,987/48	Could accommodate an IL-38 and a TU-95.
Comoros	Moroni/ Hahala	11°32'S/43°16'E	15	2,900/45 (asphalt)	Could accommodate an IL-38 and a TU-95.


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Figure A-2
Potential Maritime Surveillance Areas by Soviet Naval Aircraft



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